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haass: well, welcome, everybody. feliz anonuevo. happy new year. i think this may be the first event of the new year here, thefirst of what will be hundreds here in new york, as well as in washington, as well asaround the country. and like many of them, this will not simply be available to thoseof you in the room, but to those with access to all things digital.this is part of our series�our what to do
Health Alliance Of The Hudson Valley, about series. it�s made possible by supportfrom hbo. and what the premise of the series is to take a current foreign policy challenge�inthis case the considerable foreign policy challenge that is syria�and to ask the questionin the way an administration would ask the question, which is what to do about it. andwhat we will do is begin with an assessment
of the situation, which again is the way anational security council meeting would tend to unfold, just get the latest about what�shappening in and around and affecting the situation that�s being discussed. and thensecondly, we�re going to just make sure that we summarize existing policy, what itis we are�we, the united states, are doing. and then, thirdly, what i�m going to dois turn to the three gentlemen up here about what it is they think we ought to be doingdifferently and what they believe it would require and what they believe it would likelyresult in. and we�ll all talk for a bit, and then we�ll open it up to you, our members.we�ve got three people here of enormous, and in some ways overlapping, experience.but again, it�s quite reflective of what
a real meeting would be. like, at the farend, i�ll start with paul, paul pillar. paul is an experienced intelligence hand.he was the nio, the national intelligence officer, for the near east and south asia.that�s on the staff of the national intelligence council. so he would be the person who wouldhave the principal pen when it came to writing so-called estimates, which are the principal,most influential documents that emerge from the intelligence community. he now writesin an unclassified way, sitting�affiliated with places such as georgetown university,their center for strategic studies. and in the transparency tradition, he and i workedtogether. when i was at the state department, he was at the national intelligence council.and we worked closely together there in the
run-up and aftermath of the 2003 iraq war.to his right is phil gordon. i think of the four of us, phil is the individual with themost recent government experience. he worked at the national security council. he was aspecial assistant to president obama. and he was the white house coordinator for themiddle east, north africa, and the gulf. and now we are fortunate enough to have him hereat the council on foreign relations, where he is a senior fellow. last and hardly least,closest to me is mike doran. he also had a job similar to what phil�s was, similarto one i had back when, which was the senior director for the middle east and north africa,also on the national security council. what years did you have that?doran: 2005 to �7.
haass: 2005 to �7, there you got it. soyou got�he�s now�i should say mike is currently affiliated with the hudson institute,where he�s a senior fellow. so again, what you�ve got here are three people, all ofwhom have been in the situation room for more hours than is healthy. (laughter.) but thereyou have it. so i�m going to start with paul. and basically,let�s start to paint the scene. so let�s talk about the situation literally and figurativelyon the ground. and then i also want to spend a few minutes painting the situation diplomaticallywith the talks that have been going on, because in a sense one has two realities now. onehas a physical reality on the ground and one has a diplomatic reality that�s trying toaffect the situation on the ground. so, paul,
why don�t you start and then i�ll askphil and mike to leap in. pillar: thanks, richard. it�s a real privilegeto be up on this platform with these colleagues. the syrian civil war is now in its fifth year.it was 2011 when it really got rolling, when the protests became a war. and the combaton the ground has sort of flat-lined, in the sense that it�s�many more lives are stillbeing lost, but none of the multiple sides in this conflict seem to be on a trajectorywhere they can achieve a military solution, or anything close to it.several months ago, we might have perhaps concluded that the regime was losing it. butif that were true, that�s certainly been stopped by the russian military intervention,which began in late september, a little over
three months ago. that was an interventionthat had multiple objectives from putin�s point of view, some of which had nothing todo with syria, but certainly one of them was to shore up the regime. and with the airstrikesby the russians, i think at least in the short term they�ve achieved that.if you look at the map of where things stand on the ground in syria right now, it wouldshow that the regime still has control over basically a corridor that runs north to south,includes damascus, includes a couple of the other major urban areas like homs and hama,as well as the northwestern part of the country, which is a stronghold of the alawites, whoare most supportive of the regime. and then you�ve got major areas that more or lessbelong, although are contested, to non-isis
opposition groups, some of them down towardthe southwest near the golan, and then a larger area up toward the northwest.and particularly in that larger area, the al-nusra front, which is the al-qaida branchin syria, is perhaps the most active of those opposition groups. and beyond that, isis itself�i�llcall it isis, daesh, isil, islamic state, whatever you want to call it�still has controlover parts of the country along the euphrates that go from the southeast of the countryup to the turkish border. and finally, substantial parts of the northern areas that do borderturkey are controlled by syrian kurds. the opposition is as fragmented and as dividedas it�s always been. it�s a case of groups that number at least in the hundreds, by somecounts even in the thousands, that have been
forming various alliances, and coalitionsand, coalitions of alliances. and they�ve been changing quite a bit. you have a coalitionsuch as the so-called army of conquest, which has been supported by the�on the outside,by the qataris, and the saudis, and the turks. but you had other groupings as well.as far as isis is concerned, over the last year or so it�s had some gains and somelosses in territory, which pretty much nets out to about a net zero as far as syria isconcerned. they gained some ground in the center or southeastern part of the country,especially palmyra, which was the place with the antiquities you probably heard about.but they�ve also lost substantial ground to the kurds in the north. if you combinethat with what�s happened to isis in iraq,
where it�s certainly been a net loser ofthe last year, then isis as a whole has had a net loss of territory in syria and iraqover the last�over the last year. as far as the diplomatic side is concerned,the multilateral diplomacy has accelerated over the last few months. there is what becameknown as the vienna process, which was launched with a meeting in vienna in�at the end ofoctober, and was the formative session for what�s now known as the international syriasupport group. that group had a second meeting in november. and basically what they�veagreed on so far is the principle, at least, of the need for a ceasefire and a politicalsettlement, without getting into the details that they could not yet agree with�agreeon with regard to, you know, the near-term
future of assad and things of that nature.there have also been some other sessions on the diplomatic front. the saudis had a meetingin riyadh earlier last month with a lot of the opposition groups, a meeting that wasbasically rejected by the regime and by the russians in the sense of declaring it to benon-representative of those who ought to be considered legitimate oppositionists. butat least the participants in that meeting did agree on the idea that assad did not haveto go before there was any negotiations, even if they still held to the idea that he hadto go before there is any kind of real settlement. and then finally, just two and a half weeksago on the 18th of december, the u.s. security council adopted unanimously resolution 2254,which basically wrapped up some of the findings
of these earlier meetings of the support groupin vienna, issued a very strong call for a ceasefire, and called further for united nationsinvolvement with the u.n. secretary general�s special representative charged with seeingwhat he could do over the next few months and setting a target date of six months fromnow for having some kind of interim political formula.one last thing i�ll mention, richard, in terms of the scene is the dust-up we�vebeen reading about just over the last few days with regard to the saudis and the iraniansthat involved the execution of the shiite cleric and then the suspension of diplomaticrelations. obviously, none of this is good from the standpoint of making syria diplomacywork, particularly given that that vienna
meeting back in october, one of the real breakthroughsthere was it was the first time that the saudis and the iranians were sitting down in thesame room to talk seriously about a topic like this.nonetheless, i would not be overly alarmed about the effect that this particular setof affairs over the last few days would have, above and beyond what we already knew wasall the enmity that already existed between those two rival regimes. there have been plentyof other things that have taken place over the last year or so that made it challengingenough, such as the stampede at the hajj, in which hundreds of iranian hajjis were killed.and i note just the other day�or yesterday, i think�the saudi ambassador at the u.n.made a statement along the lines of let�s
not let this get in the way of our diplomacyon syria. so not overall momentum on the ground in termsof the military situation. some acceleration in activity at least on the multilateral/diplomaticfront over the last few months. haass: paul, let me just ask you one or twoquestions before i turn to the others. on the civilian population side, the numbersthat are usually used at somewhere between 2(00,000) and 300,000 syrian civilians havelost their lives, and more than half the population is either internally displaced or now refugees.is that, one, essentially right? and, two, is there any dynamic there that�s in anyway fundamentally different? pillar: it�s essentially right. the estimates�thenumber of syrians killed, most of the figures
are, like, between 150(,000) and 350,000.but roughly a quarter million would be a ballpark figure. and with regard to the refugees anddisplaced persons, we are talking about multiple millions, both in terms of the internallydisplaced and what we see going to europe and elsewhere. but in terms of changing dynamics,and other than what we�re all very familiar with in terms of the surge of refugee flowsto europe in the course of the past year, i don�t�i wouldn�t describe it as, youknow, a trend one way or another. haass: and one last question, that in termsof the recruits reaching isis, which has an impact, if you will, on the future militarytrajectory of things, do we�do we know of any fundamental changes or meaningful changesin that pattern?
pillar: the short answer is no. you know,most of the very discouraging and alarming numbers in terms of a great increase overwhat we saw before was basically a 2014 going into 2015 sort of thing. but if we�re talkingabout, say, the last six months or so, i don�t think i would say there�s really a change,no. haass: ok. phil, anything you want to addto the scene setting? gordon: no. the scene setter was great. somaybe just one brief point on each piece. on the military side, i absolutely share paul�sbottom line assessment, that this is essentially a dynamic stalemate�dynamic in the sensethat there is a lot of fighting on the ground, and towns fall in one direction or another,but stalemate in the sense that neither side
is likely to win a military victory anytimesoon. each side faces enormous challenges. the divisions on the opposition side. andon the regime side, mainly the cannibalization of their own forces.syria has a sunni majority and the backers of the regime are limited in number, they�vebeen fighting a brutal war for four years. but the reason that is�that attrition isunlikely to lead to an opposition victory anytime soon is the fact of the outside support.when you�ve got russia and russian military power and iranians and hezbollah on the ground,that regime is not likely to fall soon either. haass: can i just ask one question then aboutthe dynamic stability? if there�s a pattern of continued, graduate rollback of isis insideiraq, does that affect what either of you
are saying about the implications of the stalemateon the ground in syria? pillar: i think it does insofar as just theisis part of the picture is concerned. i mean, anything that shows isis to be shrinking ratherthan expanding is good news for us, bad news for them, and bad news for them as it affectstheir activities anywhere�or the recruitment anywhere. and that gets back to your earlierquestion about the flow of refugees. gordon: but the main�the main battle insyria, of course, is not really isis related, in the sense that it�s the anti-regime oppositionwhich is lead the fight against the regime, by definition. and the regime is leading thefight against that part of the opposition and not isis. so that�s why, you know, idon�t think�
haass: you wanted to say one other thing beforei turn it to mike? gordon: i was going to say one other thingabout the diplomacy, which again i think paul summarized very well. but don�t�it istrue that the vienna process was a positive thing, and it was good to get the saudis andthe iranians in the room for the first time, although as you say that�s been troubledby these latest developments. but the diplomatic gap remains enormous, especially on the corequestion of the fate of assad. haass: and if you want to add to the scenesetting? doran: i just want to expand on the pointthat phil just made about the gap between the diplomacy and what�s going on the ground.we got the saudis and the iranians into the
same room, but that came at a great cost.the first cost was�and our own policy shifted significantly in order to get the iraniansin. we have effectively dropped the condition that assad should leave. so on this�withregard to this�two wars went on simultaneously, the war against assad and the war againstisis. in the war against assad, we have been shifting in the direction of the russiansand the iranians in terms of dropping our demands that assad leave. that�s�haass: just to be clear, not that the�so ultimately that�s just the timing of theleaving, whether�at what point� doran: well, we have�we have pushed thetiming so far into the future, 18 months, he�s not going to leave on obama�s clock,which gives obama the ability to sit down
now and talk about coordinating or deconflictingwith the russians and the iranians comfortably, because he no longer has between them thequestion of assad. so it�s an objective tilt in the direction of the iranians andthe russians. and that has annoyed the saudis and brought the iranians in, but when we cramthe iranians down the saudis� throat in vienna. so i think a lot of this tension thatwe�re seeing between the saudis and the iranians in other areas is really displacedconflict coming out of syria. syria�s the issue. the saudis can�t afford to have adirect conflict with us over it, so they have sat down and said we�ll play nice with theiranians, but they�re not going to do it. and the iranians aren�t going to do it either.haass: let�s talk about�phil, you�re
the most recent. let�s just set the stage,at least the baseline, in terms of u.s. policy, what it is we are�we�re doing, particularlyto affect the outcome in syria directly. let�s just talk about that for a minute.gordon: so since the president said for the first time in august 2011 that assad mustgo, coming back to this point, u.s. policy has consisted of efforts to strengthen andbolster the opposition, defined as the moderate opposition, in various way, political andmilitary, so that they would be both united enough and strong enough on the ground topress the regime and its backers in iran and russia to a diplomatic settlement that wouldinclude a transition beyond assad. that has been the stated goal of u.s. policy supportedby others, europeans, gulf partners, for four
years.the fact that it has not worked, because obviously assad�they have not come to the table andnegotiated a transition. you go summer of 2012 when we negotiated with the russiansthe geneva communique that called for a transitional governing body with full executive authoritythat would be determined by, quote, unquote, mutual consent�all of that was diplomaticjargon for saying you had to find a way to get beyond assad and put a transitional governmentin power. that remains essentially u.s. policy today�find ways to support and unify themoderate opposition so that it can press for a political settlement.now, mike is right that over time i think it�s fair to say that the definition ofwhat that transition would look like has evolved
because the initial hopes, especially in thewake of the arab spring, was that it would come about fairly rapidly and fairly completely,and that assad and this regime would be removed and something better would come in. but overtime, as it was clear that iran and russia were going to back the regime and it wasn�tgoing anywhere, diplomats have been looking for different versions of a transition planthat might be more achievable in the absence of the most desirable transition, which wouldbe a full one. haass: but in terms of what we�re actuallydoing, it seems to me one would obviously talk about air power, a degree of specialforces, a degree of support. why don�t we�let�s just go through the components of our policy,because i expect as soon as we get done with
that, then we can talk about how some of thatought to change. gordon: right. so i said it was politicaland military. on the political side, there have been efforts to try to unify the groupson the ground so that there�s a coherent structure to represent the opposition. andthe united states and others put enormous efforts into unifying those groups, and hasnot been able to do so, in part because of just how fragmented they are on the groundand in part because our diplomatic partners in this enterprise are strongly aligned withdifferent groups on the ground. and there have been multiple efforts to try to get everyonetogether. and the united states has led some of thoseefforts. there�s something called the london
11 process where we and our closest partners,those who are supporting groups on the ground materially, would come together and try tounify this opposition politically. and the state of that effort is, let us say, incomplete�(laughter)�becausethey remain hugely fragmented because�again, you look at, you know, the saudis have theirclients and favorite partners on the ground, the qataris, the turks, the jordanians, andourselves. so on the political side we�re trying to bring them together.and then on the military side, there have been various forms of support to try to strengthenthe capacity of the opposition to use its leverage, some from the united states andits european partners and then others with their own pipelines who are providing militaryequipment to the opposition to strengthen
it vis-�-vis the regime. but they are fightingan armed, existing, standing military, backed by russia and iran. and so on the militaryside, our efforts have also not nearly been enough to bring about the political transitionthat�s the goal of u.s. policy. haass: and in terms of the intensity of thebombing that we�re carrying out against�basically against isis targets?gordon: well, yeah, that�s why i didn�t mentioned bombing, because, you know, if whatwe�re talking about here is how do you leverage the regime for a political transition�haass: well, we�re talking about everything, not just that�gordon: ok. but our bombing, as you say, is directed at isis. and the united states hasnot made it a policy to directly intervene
militarily against the regime.haass: right, so basically you have a diplomatic policy that�s, if you will, on one track,and a military policy that to some extent is on another track.gordon: it�s not�it�s not on another track, in the sense the military policy isalso designed to bolster the opposition, but with a clear limit. and that limit, for theunited states, has been direct military intervention. so the president has authorized military forceagainst isis, the legal basis of which was actually supporting the iraqi government,which asked for support because you needed some legal basis for doing that. you can fightisis, this was a threat to the iraqi government, but there isn�t a legal basis for the unitedstates using force directly against the syrian
regime.haass: before i ask for people�s recommendations let me just ask one analytical question. ifnothing�s changed�basically, if we have a version of what we see how and u.s. policydoesn�t change because there�s no fundamental change or breakthrough on the peace talksor no fundamental change from either party, when we reconvene this meeting in six monthsor a year is the situation plus or minus what it is now?gordon: oh, it�s minus. and when we do get to what we should do about it, that wouldbe my starting point. if there�s not a significant change in our collective approach to syria,what we�ll see whenever we convene, whether it�s six months from now or six years fromnow, i think we would just see an even greater
humanitarian tragedy, where this 2(00,000)or 300,000 number would be twice that, the refugee flow destabilizing neighbors withthe millions of refugees in turkey, jordan, iraq, and lebanon overwhelming and destabilizingthose countries, spreading to europe, affecting our debate here. i think all of these strategicconsequences of the war would clearly be in the minus category and not the plus category.haass: but your calling for a dynamic gridlock sounds like it�s a recipe for dynamic instability.gordon: but i think that is undebatable. the instability is rising and will continue to.haass: ok, unless someone feels the urge to get in, let�s make the pivot, as we sayin asia, to what we then�what we should be doing differently. i always say there�stwo choices you have in any either organization
or policy. you either do different thingsor you do the same things differently, or both. so what is it here with syria? do wedo different things or we do the same things differently, or some combination? mike, whydon�t we start with you? doran: i think we have to do things very differently.phil said that�you know, explained that we�re not really supporting the oppositionagainst assad. we�re not just not doing it�gordon: no, i said we are supporting the opposition against assad, but with limits.doran: not that part of the opposition that is actually fighting assad, right? there�ssevere limits to what we�re doing. if you look at it from the 30,000-foot level, therussians and the iranians have intervened
in syria in support of the regime. and wehave not�there has been no commensurate activity on the part of the united statesin response. president obama announced in may of 2014 a $500 million train and equipprogram to train the opposition, giving the sense that he was going to train the oppositionagainst assad. but he put political limits on that. the only people that they would trainwere people who would sign up only to fight isis and not to fight assad. and as of fallyou can tell me how many soldiers came out of that train and equip program�five, four?so we�re simply not doing it. so from the point of view of our sunni alliesin the region, we are�we are tilting in the direction of russia and iran. we are workingmilitarily on the ground with kurds who are
directly�kurds in syria who are directlyaligned with the pkk in turkey. so we can�t win this. the reason we have 100�or a 65-membercoalition that�s been at war for a year and can�t defeat 20(,000) or 30,000 guys�nastyguys with pickup trucks is because we don�t have any sunni allies. we�re alienatingthe turks by supporting the kurds. we�re alienating the saudis by supporting�by tiltingin the direction of the iranians and the russians. and we�re not actually training and equippingthe opposition on the ground. we can�t win this without sunni allies. that is the�thatis the number-one program that we have to solve. and we can�t do that, richard, withoutrealigning against iran. haass: ok, but what is�i�m going to pushyou on one more question. so what would it
mean, though, on the ground? whatever it iswe do or don�t do with iran, what would we actually have to do differently? i mean,let me just give you some options. is it that we would bomb 2x, 3x, 4x, or against differenttargets? would we be putting more u.s. forces on the ground? if so, how many for what purpose?is it to create various safe havens or no-fly zones out of which forces would operate? wouldit be far-greater arming of the kurds, even at the cost of our relationship with turkey?what is would be�because, again, if you have a�if the status quo plus going forwardis only going to give us more misery, what is it we do differently?doran: we establish a�we establish a coalition of our traditional regional allies�turkey,saudi arabia, and so on�in close support
of training and equipping opposition to assadon the ground, the kind of�exactly the program that president obama announced at west pointin may 2014. we do work with the kurds, but we work with the kurds�we work with thekurds only within a limited area, being mindful that they have ambitions that go way beyondwhat we want to be encouraging. haass: let me interrupt you for a second justso i understand, so would you move from an anti-isis first policy to an anti-assad firstpolicy? doran: i would�syria is the center of gravity.it�s more important than iraq. that is the�that is the issue on which everybody else in theregion is aligning. and our position on assad is absolutely crucial to mobilizing�to mobilizingsunni opposition to isis and assad. the two
things are interrelated. so i would�i wouldput an emphasis on both simultaneously, but making sure that everyone understood thatwe were serious about getting rid of assad. haass: and just one last question and theni�ll turn to your two colleagues. so you would have us do more for forces and basicallysaying we�re giving you these arms and you can go attack the regime with them. wouldthe united states under your approach take any direct military action against the regime?doran: yes, we could�we would�we could do in support of. we have to have forces onthe ground. you can think of a ratio of maybe one to five, perhaps. we can start�the mostimportant thing, though, is not the tactics on the ground but the paradigm in which we�reoperating.
haass: but let me just press you, just soi understand. imagine we were to give support to some sunni tribe. and the idea would be,they can take on the assad government, which is what their priority would be. and theyget into trouble and they call in. would we provide close air support for them againstforces of the government? doran: yes. yes, yes, yes.haass: even if those forces of the government were backed by iran and russia?doran: yes. haass: ok, i�m just trying to�clarityis good. and i�m just pushing you for clarity. i just want to understand the logic of your�doran: but you can�the thing is�the thing is that we can�the model for all this isthe surge in iraq, right? and you can mobilize
forces in local areas to�in local areasfor local�for local objectives. haass: with the difference�one of the manydifferences would be that the surge in iraq, which you worked on, was that you did nothave the equivalent of an iran, and a saudi arabia, and a russia back�doran: well, no, i�m saying�the threat in what you�the danger in what you justsuggested is that it would push us immediately into war with russia, which would be a badidea, i agree. (laughter.) but so you don�t�you don�t�we can pick and choose targets�wecan pick and choose targets in order to establish a position in syria, right, that would thengive us much greater leverage in the diplomacy against russia and iran without bringing usinto direct conflict with them immediately.
gordon: can i clarify one thing too, in thespirit of clarity, since mike said that i said that we weren�t supporting the opposition.i want to be very clear on that. the united states is and has been supporting the opposition.the department of defense overt train and equipment program to which you referred, you�reabsolutely right, did not get off the ground because it was targeted at isis and you couldn�tget recruits to fight isis. but the united states has consistently been supporting therest of the opposition. we don�t detail�the administration doesn�t detail the politicaland military ways in which it supports the opposition. but it has, and it does, and ijust want to be clear about that. doran: but just one point on this, when putinintervened, he bombed forces trained by the
cia. what was our response? his first targetswere�his first targets were opposition elements that the u.s. had been working with. his targets�histargets up on the turkish borders are elements that the turks are�turkmen, right? they�renot isis, right? we have a nato ally supporting turkmen on the border. he�s attacking them.what�s our position? haass: one question�let me just ask youguys a question, which is rather than necessarily calling in u.s. close air support, would notone of the potential for the united states to consider a category of armament that wewould provide to sunni tribes in syria, that would, for example, make it much more difficultfor iranian or russian airpower to be used against them? why wouldn�t we�why wouldn�twe consider the idea of giving them far more
capable air defense systems so they coulddefend themselves if they were undertaking a local offensive? what�s wrong with somethinglike that? doran: that would be beautiful.haass: is that something you would�i mean, is something we ought to consider?gordon: the challenge of�i mean, what you�re essentially talking about is manpads, man-portableair-defense system, which would in fact be useful in deterring the syrian regime fromusing air power, which has been a factor. unfortunately, they�re also useful in shootingcivilian aircraft out of the sky. and so you have balance the risk that these air defenses,which locally used would be�may be beautiful in mike�s words, but it wouldn�t be beautifulthe first time a civilian aircraft on the
way to, you know, tel aviv or somewhere ineurope came down. haass: so let me push you and paul, what isit�given that your analysis is fairly bleak, all things left alone where we�re heading,what is it you would do or recommend be done differently at this point? paul, we�ll startwith�we�ll give phil a break. pillar: well, i think we ought to start withthe first principles. number one is, no matter how heart wrenching the problem is, even thesuperpower can�t always solve the problem to our satisfaction. number two is�and sothat�s�you can read a sort of status quo implication into that. number two is thatthere are all kinds of conflicts being played out by the other actors there internal tosyria in the region that are simply not reflective
of u.s. interest. it is not an interest ofthe united states to take sides between sunni and shia. it is not an interest of the unitedstates to have a particular outcome�a political outcome in a particular capital. we have ourinterests with regard to our own lives and resources. we certainly have a strong terroristconcern with regard to isis. but this is a long-winded way of saying, tothe extent that i would do things differently, it would be more of an emphasis on the diplomatictrack with the kind of flexibility that would make negotiated interim arrangements morefeasible. and this gets back to what mike raised before about the assad must go formula.you know, mike described it as a backing off from the assad must go. and although we�renot looking backward at former mistakes, i
think what i would do differently is a clearerand more specific, and more complete backing off from the assad must go in the timeframewe�re talking about with regard to interim arrangements. eventually, he�s going tohave to go. but the assads have been in power in damascus for 45 years�30 under the father,hafez, and the last 15 under bashar. and you�d have a hard time convincing me that, you know,needing to go is one of the things that is essential for bringing this situation moreunder control. the basic principle here, i think it is thewar itself and the conflict itself, rather than a particular political outcome, thatmakes for the bad things that we as americans ought to be worried about, especially isisand especially what other radicals, as well
as the al-nusra front, breed upon. that wastrue with regard to iraq, where there wasn�t this group before the regime was overthrownwith our invasion. and it�s true with regard to the syrian civil war, where the biggestboost that isis got after it came into existence was the war itself and taking advantage ofthe chaos. so i think what all that adds up to is i wouldn�t change a whole lot, exceptto recognize that the objective�the prime objective is not to engineer a particularpolitical outcome, but to tamp down the war, to reduce the violence, reduce the chaos,because that�s what the extremists, isis included, breed upon.haass: can i then�i�m not sure if it�s asking a question�i want to paraphrase whatyou said, and tell me if it does violence
to what it was you were suggesting, is thatfor humanitarian reasons we�d like to see the situation in syria calm, so more peoplecould certainly stay alive and hopefully not have to flee their homes. we�d like to seethe terrorists reduced in number and ability to carry out terrorism. but the united statesdoes not particularly have a major stake in such things as the complexion of the syriangovernment, indeed, borders of syria, whether syria in any way looks like a normal nation-state.that what you�re suggesting in some ways is a more modest set of american interests,given how difficult it is to get ambitious in syria.pillar: i don�t think that does violence to what i�m saying. i wouldn�t want toimplication that we don�t care about syria
as an eventual unified state over the longterm, because if you start, you know, breaking up the boundaries then that raises all kindsof other questions. but overall, i think that�s a fair description.haass: phil, what would you�what would you do differently at this point, given your ownanalysis? gordon: so i would do something differentlythat flows from my analysis, which is my analysis�you asked me to describe what u.s. policy was.and i said it has been to strengthen the opposition to the point where we can use leverage tonegotiate a political solution in which assad goes. i don�t think that policy is workingand i don�t think it is likely to work anytime soon. that�s what i said sort of analytically.and that is because we are not asking the
regime to make compartmentalized or modestconcessions, like give up its chemical weapons or give up a part of the country. we�reasking it to disappear, to the risk of all of those who happen to be still supportingit. and we�re asking it to do that, even though it has strong backing from major powerslike iran and russia, which have very profound strategic interests in committing, to thepoint that russia is actually willing to intervene militarily.so the course we�re on is unlikely to work. now, an alternative, in the direction thatmike pointed, would be to say whatever it takes and go all in and do whatever we wouldneed to do to remove that regime, which is no doubt in the u.s. capacity to do. but ithink the result would be what we kind of
call, you know, catastrophic success. (laughter.)we would root out the regime, but then, you know, create millions more refugees, all ofthose who happen to be still supporting the regime�the alawites, christians, the sunnisthat are still supporting the regime�and find ourselves either leaving syrian in evenmore state of war among all of these competing factions, let alone the confrontation withrussia and so on. so i think that what we need to adjust�andthis is our political objective�if your current means are not adequate to achievingyour objective, you either have to change the means or change the objectives. i thinkchanging the means is unrealistic and possibly counterproductive. the objective, on the otherhand, should really be�and i agree with
paul on this�stopping the war. there wasa time, maybe in 2011, where you could have argued that it was, quote, unquote, worththe war, that getting rid of assad would be a good thing and wars have�you know, thereare costs of wars, but those costs would be worth it to have a better thing in place.i think now when you look at the strategic consequences of this war, the hundreds ofthousands of killed, the more than 10 million who have been displaced, the destabilizationin jordan, lebanon, iraq, syria, the creation of isis, the radicalization of young muslimsacross the middle east and in europe and in the united states, and the reality that ifwe don�t stop the war those things are all going to get worse, i don�t even think it�sa close call. in that sense�
doran: but when you say stop the war, thatmeans support assad, iran, and russia, right? that�s what you�re saying?gordon: no, it means change the political objective from insistence that russia, andiran, and syria abandon any role in syria, even though they have significant supportin some quarters there, and prioritize a ceasefire over the political transition that we stillwant and should still push for. doran: that means support iran, russia�iran,russia�let�s just be clear because we�re not stopping the war.gordon: no, it doesn�t mean supporting iran and russia.doran: we�re helping iran and russia win. that�s what we�re doing.gordon: no. let me�so let me�
doran: that�s how we�re stopping.gordon: it is stopping short of completely driving russia and iran out of syria, thatis correct. and if you want to pay the price to do that�again, i think we�re militarilycapable of doing that. we would start by shooting down the russian planes that are currentlyoperating there. and by the way, the ships�they have s-300s and s-400s on ships in the mediterraneanthat would also be hit. doran: no, no, no, no. let�s just�let�sjust use clear language about what we�re saying, right? we�re not stopping the war.we�re taking a side. and we�re taking the opposite side from the one i want to.gordon: i think my words are a more accurate description of what i was trying to say.doran: well, how do you get to that war stopping
without supporting them?gordon: well, i�ll say one last thing. pillar: relevant to mike�s point�and iagree with phil on this particular question�on where russia is coming from. this isn�ta matter of sort of giving in to russia and iran. the russian military intervention hashad all kinds of negatives that we�re familiar with, but i think there are at least a coupleof positives that are directly relevant to what we�re discussing here. one, it givesputin more skin in this game in the sense that he and his country have that much moreof a disadvantage the longer this goes on, the more resources it takes up, the more thatrussia becomes the object of radical sunni ire, as we were reminded of with the planebeing bombed in the sinai. that�s a good
thing from the standpoint of the diplomaticobjectives that phil and i were talking about. and secondly, insofar as he�s helped topull assad�to stabilize assad�s position on the ground, it presumably gives him thatmuch more leverage over assad when we get to those very difficult negotiating questionsabout political futures and do we have part of the current regime, but assad himself doesn�tgo, those sorts of things. so let�s not talk about, oh, we�re just going to giveinto russia and iran. the russian intervention has actually given us something to work with.and we can pull a� doran: we�re going to defeat russia by chokingit to death by feeding it syria, is what you�re saying?gordon: can i just�can i just finish?
pillar: no, i�m saying they�ve got a�i�msaying russia has objectives and motivations consistent with the objective of tamping downthis conflict, having a negotiated formula that does not necessarily involve bashar assadstaying in power. doran: they just�they just�iran and russiajust intervened militarily to shore up the assad regime. and you�re saying that somehow,by sitting back and allowing them to do that, we�re going to put ourselves in a positionwhere they�re going to dismantle the assad regime and open it up to sunni participation.it�s completely contradictory. pillar: it is not�no it isn�t. it is notin the interests of either tehran or russia to have this conflict go on indefinitely witha beleaguered bashar assad for another year,
or two years, five years. it is not in theirinterests� doran: i see no sign that they define theirinterests as you�re defining their interests. haass: this is like the government where youlose control of interagency meetings. (laughter.) so for those of you who wonder what it�sreally like, this is painfully accurate. (laughter.) phil.gordon: let me finish, and i think it also answers mike�s allegation about, you know,giving into iran and syria. just to be clear, i am not proposing that we work with russia,and iran, and assad. that view is out there that we should somehow partner with them,you know, as part of our anti-isis campaign. that�s not what i�m proposing. i am proposingthat we seek to end the current conflict more
or less along the lines of control that arecurrently on the ground. and the main�and i would argue that while not perfect�because,look, i would love to see iranian and russian influence disappear from the region too�thatoutcome if we could get it, and i think that�s what deserves some conversation is could weget it�i would argue that that outcome would be many times better than what we currentlyhave, or than would be the result of a doubling down on a military approach to drive iranand russia out of syria. so i think the real issue, richard, is could we get this sortof outcome, nor would it be desirable. haass: let me ask one last question, thenwe�re going to open it up to our members, which is: one of the aspects of the viennaprocess and the resolution that ensued from
it, talked about an unrealistic�or, let�sput it this way�highly ambitious 18-month political calendar toward a transition andso forth. let me suggest a very different approach, and i�d just be curious to seewhat the collective reaction is, which is in order to get things moving, sometimes youtake a step that doesn�t get you where you want to go, but gets you away from where youare. so one thing would be a first-stage political transition that continued to give the alawitesan advantage position. and the idea would be that it would reassure them that they wouldbe advantaged, even if mr. assad were to be given a dacha outside of moscow or wherever.and even though that doesn�t meet the�it doesn�t reflect the demographics of syriagiven the composition of the society, that
if your first goal is to remove the individualwho is so associated with fueling the war and recruiting for isis, should we not have,rather than such an ambitious, almost political neutral transition plan, why not have a muchmore biased transition plan, which is not, shall we say�doesn�t meet, you know, theperfection of the federalists, but it might meet something, which is the reality of syria,that we need to persuade the alawites of syria that they will not suffer the same fate asthe sunnis of iraq after saddam. so why not think about a political transition ratherthan an idealistic one, like you see in vienna, why not something much more biased towardsthe status quo, with the one exception is it might facilitate the departure of the individualwho so personifies the problem? what is wrong
with that? there�s my new idea. what iswrong with that? gordon: nothing�s wrong with it, and it�svery much on the table. you know, i think we have long-since discarded the notion thatthe transition would be a wholesale transition and that the opposition would take power andthe entire regime would disappear. and there are all sorts of creative versions of thatwhich, again, started with wholesale transition and then went to, well, what if assad couldstay and you revise the constitution, you empower the executive, but the presidencybecomes more ceremonial? or what if that, plus he then agreed to leave in 18 months?or that, plus there�s elections� haass: well, then they�ve got a real advantage.you have both representatives of russia and
turkey, who are familiar with such arrangements.(laughter.) so you�ve got a leg-up on� gordon: but that�s where the middle groundof vienna is. haass: it�s a cheap-shot joke.gordon: and i think most of the 20 countries or so that are participating in vienna wouldlove just that sort of thing. the problem is, minor problem, so far neither the regime,nor the opposition, nor their main supporters will go for it. because you have the oppositionon the ground backed by especially saudi arabia and turkey say no way. we�re not empoweringthe alawites. and you have russia and iran saying, we�re not even giving that. so thechallenge of the diplomacy here is to find some way to�haass: i�m going to give you each one last
short word, then i�m going to open it up.mike and then paul. doran: so, i�d just like to say that asphil said very clearly, we have instability going on into the future. we don�t havea choice of stability. we don�t have a choice of peace. we have a choice of the currentdynamic or trying to change the dynamic. the only way to change the dynamic is to�isto generate forces on the ground. we should do that with an eye to generating sunni allies.if we do not have sunni allies, we cannot defeat isis. as long as we are aligned withrussia and iran, and we are aligned with them, as long as we are perceived to be alignedwith them by the regional powers and with the pkk kurds, we will not have anyone inthe region that will genuinely support what
we�re trying to do against isis.so the anti-assad forces and the anti-isis forces, if we want success in either side,we have to do both simultaneously. if we do what paul and phil are suggesting, we cannotdefeat isis. so let�s just be clear about that. that�s what i�m trying to say. thereis�there is no work with iran and russia or carve out part of syria for them and defeatisis together. that will never work. haass: paul, you get the last string and thenwe�ll open it up. pillar: i�ll just react to your suggestion,richard, which i think has a lot of merit to it. the one sort of qualifier i�d puton it is to make sure everyone understands that it is interim and that enough of a diplomaticmomentum or enough of a diplomatic and political
mechanism is there that there wouldn�t bethe suspicion that this would become another one of the so-called interim arrangementsthat lasts forever. but one thing in support of your idea is the indication of a lot ofdiscontent within the alawite community with how assad and the regime decision makers havehandled things. there is a great deal of support, from all indications, of an assad-less future,in which alawites would see that they would still have a part in syria.haass: ok. with that, let�s�now that we�ve solved it up here, let�s open it up. andwe�ll try to get as many people as�i see a famous pollster in the next to last rowthere. just introduce yourselves, be direct. q: sure, thanks. craig charney from charneyresearch. and as richard said, we have worked
on the syrian problem a bit.one of the things that has surprised me in the conversation so far has been the focuson tactics rather than the focus on end states. and i�m curious what sorts of end statesyou think might be able to resolve this situation. some people have suggested partition, whichde facto or de jure seem to be implied in phil�s comments. others have talked aboutlebanonization, you know, as after the taif accord�a weak central government, power-sharing,and competition between pro- and anti-iranian factions, but based more on ballots than bullets.maybe there are other possibilities. but what are you thinking we should be aiming for?haass: good question. what do you think? because it gets back a little bit, do we have�shouldwe be stuck to some version of trying to restore
the status quo ante? you�ve got the disappearanceof an effective border between syria and iraq. you�ve got kurdish and other forces thatobviously have claims on both sides. you got sunnis. so why not think more imaginativelyeither about how to reconstruct syria or how to reconstruct even parts of the region.gordon: so i can start. i�ve done some thinking about end states. just together with jim dobbinsand some other colleagues we published a paper at rand that looked at a potential end statethat would start with what i�m talking about here, which is a ceasefire in place, moreor less. and paul well described the terrain with the kurds mostly in the north and theregime has sort of the damascus spine on the west coast, and you have the moderate oppositionaround idlib and aleppo, and then in the south,
which would be a noncontiguous area for them.and then at present, you have isis in a zone that we would all have to fight.but if you could get a ceasefire in place based on local government, local policing,autonomy of these zones, more or less aligning with the situation on the ground now, andmore or less aligning on the ethno-sectarian composition of those areas, then you havea vision for something that might bring some relative stability. let me be clear, that�snot partition, because i don�t think we want to start in the middle east going downthe road of carving out new states, because you have no idea where it would end. but youalso have to be honest and realistic that the old syria under rule out of damascus justis not going to be put back together again.
haass: but, phil, why not have a�if yousay, to your last point, why not think about something like alawistan. so you have eithermr. assad or his successor is over�is the mayor of some kind of an autonomous regionof alawites. you have sunnistan. you have elements of a kurdish�syrian kurdish area.why be wedded to the nation-state model in a part of the world where, quite honestly,if you look at the history of the nation-state model and the maps, it�s, shall we say,controversial at best. it�s 100 years old. so why not�why not think imaginatively?and why assume that it�s necessarily going to be worse than what we have, because it�spretty bad what we have? gordon: that is more or less how i�m thinkingabout it. i mean, you can�you know, what
you call these things and the formality ofborders, but essentially these regions become responsible for self-government. i would preferthat it remain in something still identified as syria, just so you�re not setting precedentsfor�but those to me seem to be details. haass: we have versions of that in iraq now.gordon: of course you do. and that�s just the reality.doran: i think phil makes a good point about not wanting to open up the�as problematicas these units are, it�s impossible to imagine any other unit that is going to be less problematic.and the minute you throw open the question of syria, then you throw open the questionof should we have an independent kurdistan. that then would�would the�would the kurdistanin syria have claims on kurds in turkey and
so on? you open up a whole can of worms, andit�s a recipe for continued violence in and of itself.so i think the way you square the circle is, along the lines of what phil is saying, somekind of regionalized, federalized syria and a federalized�and a federalized iraq. butyou can�t get from where we are now to what you are suggesting without having forces onthe ground that are going to carry out this partition.haass: i would just sort of say i do think there�s a case for rethinking things likeindependent kurdistan, because if the kurds are the most effective fighters against isis,you may want to think about what�s the conditional deal you would form with kurds in iraq andsyria. you may not want it, for good reason,
to extend to kurds in turkey or iran, butthere might be a case for a mini-kurdistan that the united states should support as anindependent state. doran: they�re only�they�re only effectivefighters against isis in those areas which correspond to their vision of kurdistan.haass: right. doran: so they�re not�they�re not effectiveallies against isis writ large. they can�t�they�re not the basis for a new order.haass: sure, kimberly. q: hi. i�m kimberly marten from barnardcollege at columbia university. thank you for an absolutely terrific set of presentations.my question is that everybody�s been talking as if everything is very rational, and ifwe can come up with a solution that serves
everybody�s interest. but what we�ve seenall over the world when we�ve had one form or another of ethnic or sectarian conflictis a desire for revenge after the conflict itself is over. and we certainly saw thatwith the attempt to come up with a reasonable solution in iraq, because it turned out tobe a disaster to give the police and the health ministry to the shia because they used itto take out revenge against the sunnis. so what role do you think revenge attacks willhappen after the actual fighting is done? and is there anything that we can do try totry limit the damage of what we know will be the revenge attacks that will target civiliansin the future? haass: paul?pillar: i think it�s related to the previous
question in that, insofar as you have thekind of formula that phil described, where you have real authority being exercised inlocalities and regions on the ground. this presumably would at least lessen the physicalcapability for this kind of thing, as opposed to throwing everyone into one polity with,you know, no effective borders on the ground. so, yes, there will be revenge attacks. youare quite right in citing history of other things. besides the sort of regional delegatingreal authority and, in effect, boundaries, even if they�we don�t draw new boundarieson the map, on the ground, there are the other lessons that have been learned from southafrica and other places with regard to things like truth and reconciliation commissionsthat do effect the political atmosphere at
least marginally in the direction of reducingthe amount of bloodshed that comes from the all-too-real fact of revenge killings.haass: i would just think that the answer to revenge killings, rather than truth andreconciliation, are dealing with the past, which i think is a bridge too far here. again,i think it comes back to thinking about a map that reflects more homogeneity ratherthan heterogeneity. and it goes against certain western liberal thinking about how societiesought to be constructed, but sometimes the best is the enemy of the possible.gordon: it necessitates that. and you know, the vienna communiques�which are, you know,admirable�talk about rebuilding an inclusive, transparent syria. and that�s a�that�sa terrific goal, but it�s just not realistic
while people have recently been killing eachother and are killing each other now. so it reinforces the need for that realization.and i would also argue it reinforces the need to decouple the ceasefire from the politicalprocess, because as hard as the political process will be for years, while it is goingon�while the fighting is going on, they�re just not going to agree.haass: raghida? q: raghida dergham, al hayat.phil, you cannot decouple the ceasefire from the peace process because it�s not goingto work. i think�i think mike is absolutely right that we need to make sure that we havethe sunnis fighting this war against isis. and in order to do that, you cannot do thatin an alliance with iran in syria. that defeats
the purpose. you have to be pragmatic, nomatter what you think about iran, decouple what we want to do with iran in terms of thenuclear deal, which has been already accepted by the gulf states. but you can�t give themsyria on top of iraq. that will backlash. and i think, paul, i mean, what you�re saying�leaveit as it is and just doctor it a little bit�is a disastrous potential. you haven�t�neitherone of you have made the argument as to why would it be good to just go along the linesof what we have right now, a de facto partition. i don�t�i don�t see the argument, thatwhy would this be less bloodshed, less people killed.and finally, richard, what you said�your idea, which is a very good idea�it�s exactlywhat the russians have started to do in the
vienna process.haass: now i�m in trouble. (laughter.) q: (laughs.) no, but in fact�in fact�andthis has been agreed to by the saudis and the other participants in the vienna process,to decouple�you know, to spilt the man�assad the man from the regime in syria. and so thathas been a good beginning, and that�s been pretty much agreed to by pushing�by agreeinghere in new york to push back for 18 months. and i think that should�the internationalcommunity should be building on that, above all the united states, in order to guaranteethat we don�t postpone talking about assad to later and then have him stay de facto aswell. that also would be disastrous. haass: ok. phil, let�s just keep comingback to this, because it�s really a direct
question of your idea that you could everhave things calm down so long as you have assad in power. and then it�s the questionof�it gets to mike�s point�there�s not a lot of sunni arab interest in fightingisis, if you will, and just around the reality of assad being in power; that, indeed, forpeople like me the reason you want assad out of power is not just to enlist sunni tribes,but ultimately you want to enlist the syrian government against isis. and the only waywe could ever partner with the syrian government is with a post-assad syrian government. sothe idea�i mean, how is it you react to all that?gordon: so two things. and like�i mean, i think we�ve all acknowledged there areno good option(s) and it�s easy to see the
downsides to all of them. i�d say two thingsto raghida. and the proof of that is that raghida thought�said we were all wrong,so. (laughter.) haass: i didn�t hear that. (laughs, laughter.)gordon: i heard�(laughter)�ok, fair enough. haass: i thought she made very good points.gordon: almost all of us. (laughter.) everyone she addressed was wrong.mr. : yeah, exactly. gordon: two things. one is, to repeat, ifi thought there was some realistic way to achieve this goal that we all aspire to�amoderate, decent government that replaces assad in syria�then i would absolutely favorthat. the problem is there is not a path that gets you there that doesn�t seem to havea worse consequence. that is the path that
we have been on, and we�ve seen the resultof that for four years. so the problem is, i think, that of all the potential outcomesif we were to double down and use force and drive out the russians�of all of the potentialoutcomes of that, decent moderates coming to power in damascus and governing all ofsyria seem to be the most unlikely. so i just think that�s just the realistic startingpoint. now, you�re�it�s fair enough for youto say, why would anyone go with my approach or a ceasefire or devolution, especially afterall this war. all i can say is it�s never really been put on the�on the table. youknow, the question is, could you ever get the opposition to stop fighting? could youever get the turks and the saudis to stop
fueling them? if has never been put on thetable that, for�in exchange for deferring their political objective of getting rid ofassad and having a new transitional government and all of that, they could get local governance,humanitarian assistance, prisoner releases, the end of assad�s offensive operations,the end of barrel bombs, support from the international community, and the beginningof a process that would ultimately deal with syrian governance and institutions. i thinkthat is a lot more attractive a future for these poor syrians, and frankly their sponsors,than what�s on offer now and what�s likely in the future.haass: i see a hand back there. i can�t see who it is, sorry. yes, ma�am. i don�thave my glasses on.
q: hi. sarah leah whitson, human rights watch.phil, i understand and sympathize with president obama�s handwringing over the past severalyears regarding military intervention in syria, but what wasn�t discussed at all is that,in fact, military intervention in syria is underway against isis. and i haven�t heardanybody articulate why that�s a national security interest in a way that everythingelse happening in syria is not. and second, i agree with you that the bestoption right now is ending the destruction of syria through some kind of a process thatwill end the war. but the concern i have is that the vienna process is actually reallya war process and not a peace process, because it really attempts to unify some of the oppositionwith assad to fight�continue a fight against
nusra and isis in over a third of the country,and very explicitly says that the ceasefire will not apply to areas under the controlof isis and nusra. so how is it that the very process that�s being laid out is actuallyenvisioning a continued fight, where everyone is unified against isis and nusra?gordon: you want me to start with that? doran: i would like to add that that was avery good question. (laughter.) gordon: again, to repeat, there are no simpleanswers in syria, and it�s impossible to have pure consistency across the board. buthere are the answers to those questions. you know, why fight isis and not the regime?i think we�ve concluded�you know, not just the president, but the united states�thatisis is a real threat, kidnapping/beheading
americans, seeking to take over and destabilizeour partners in the region, and impose a really horrid, barbaric regime, and we have everyinterest in stopping that. and we have concluded that there are discreet and effective thingswe can do militarily to contain that threat and degrade it, and ultimately destroy it.and that�s what we are doing materially in both iraq and in syria. it does, as mikeand i have discussed before, raise challenges, because to do it in iraq�to fight isis iniraq, you inevitably find yourself on the same side as iran. i wish i knew geometrywell enough to do it without being on the same side of iran, but that�s not an option.when isis is taking ramadi and mosul and threatening baghdad, yes, if you�re killing isis membersin iraq, you�re doing it on the same side
as some nasty shia militia. i don�t likethat, but we have concluded that it�s in our interest to do that.that�s very different from, and i don�t think naturally leads to, oh, well, if you�regoing to send some special forces or use airstrikes against isis in syria, it must be a good ideato do it against the regime as well. they�re two separate questions, and doing it againstthe regime we�ve talked a little bit about. but there you have to answer the question,is what are you trying to achieve and what does it take to achieve it? and i�m veryskeptical of the notion that, oh, it wouldn�t take an iraq-like occupation or 150,000 troops;just, you know, send a tough message�some airstrikes here, some tow missiles there,and assad would get the message and come to
the table. that is very inconsistent withour experience throughout history in the middle east and elsewhere.and don�t imagine�again, if we were asking for a discreet concession, like giving upchemical weapons�which wasn�t even all that discreet; it was a pretty big deal�theni think, you know, the threat of some military force can achieve it. in the balkans we usedforce. i mean, there�s some interesting lessons there. milosevic, we decided thatnato would do some bombing there and get him out of kosovo. again, we weren�t askingfor regime change, we were just asking for him to withdraw some security forces froma territory that he didn�t even control before. there it took 78 days of some 50,000sorties from nato countries before he was
even willing to do that�and the threat ofa ground force, by the way. so don�t imagine�in libya, same thing: no-fly zone, nato againsta regime in libya that hardly was backed by anyone, let alone had russian forces and iraniansand hezbollah. and there, too, it took seven months of nato bombing and arms flowing infrom across the gulf before it ended. and it didn�t end with a nice transitional governmentof gadhafi turning over�you know, agreeing to leave and keeping institutions intact;it ended with him being dragged through the street and chaos and civil war in libya. solet�s not�that�s why it�s important not to minimize what military action wouldtake in syria and what the results of military action would be.doran: i don�t want to put words in the
questioner�s mouth, but i took her to besaying something slightly different, which is that�which is that this does not endoperations by the regime, by the russians, by the iranians, the ceasefire that you�retalking about. it�s a ceasefire in certain areas, and then designates other areas asa kill zone. and all of our experience, as you�as you have so rightly pointed out,it�s not easy to force these actors to do exactly what we want.all of our experience in dealing with the russians, the iranians, and the syrian regimesuggests that if you tell them that they have the right to conduct operations in a killzone, they�re going to define the kill zone as an�as an isis, as a nusra area, whenin fact they�re going to go after the opposition
that we say we like, which is what they�vebeen doing. that�s exactly what they�ve been doing.gordon: well, which is precisely what i want to stop. and that�if they went after�imean, the premise of a ceasefire is obviously that the sides respect it, and russia or iranhave to respect it. and the deal would be that they would not be using force againstthe agreed areas. and if they did, then it would be off.but as paul, i think, said earlier, you know, this is not fun for the russians and iranians.there are real costs to the russians as well. over time, they don�t know how this is goingto end. it could end badly for them. they�re fueling sunni resistance and potential terrorismagainst russia. look at the civilian airline.
so it�s imaginable that if we were no longerasking them to give up their major client, that you could imagine them respecting thesort of ceasefire. and by the way, last thing�i know paul wantsto get in� doran: the emphasis in that�the emphasisin that sentence is on imaginable. gordon: yeah, look, everything�s hard here.and if�you know if people have one that�s really easy to imagine, i just think it�s�thereason i say imaginable is that�s what�you know, that�s sort of the best we can hopefor in a syria case, something that might be able to work. because the notion that ithink is behind your suggestion requires an even greater suspension of disbelief, thata little bit of military power leads to this
transition and putting the right people inpower. so all of these things are really hard to achieve, but i think this one is not impossibleto achieve. last point�i know paul wants to get in�theother thing�the other reason, to go back to the original question, i think it wouldbe in our interest is, well, you know, what�s really fueling isis and this terrorism thatwe�re seeing spreading? it is the conflict itself more than it is the existence of theassad regime�which, by the way, has been in power for decades. it�s the daily killingof sunnis that is mobilizing and radicalizing other sunnis around the world. if you couldstop that, that�s not fulfilling all of our goals, because we�d much rather getrid of the regime entirely, but that would
be a big deal.doran: the argument i just made is that you�re not going to stop that, and that�s whatyou�re not facing up to. haass: paul, do you want to�pillar: the united states does have important interests with regard to countering the influenceof isis that is not to be equated with any interest we have with, you know, who�s thetop dog in this capital or that capital. but the�i want to acknowledge that the questionerraises an additional important question that we need another hour session to address whichwe haven�t been addressing, and that is types and degrees of use of military forcesagainst isis, and what works and what doesn�t. there are all kinds of issues there, and allkinds of potential for being counterproductive
with regard to playing into the isis narrative,with regard to generating more recruits, which is one reason why some of the rhetoric youhear out there about, you know, taking out isis�it�ll be so easy for the superpowerto do this�leaves totally unanswered the question of what happens after we take out.in iraq or whatever, what we have, basically, is more chaos, more violence, more of thekind of vacuum that the likes of isis and al-nusra have profited from in the past.haass: well, that reinforces mike�s earlier point, which i think is the beginning of wisdomin syria�that without a sunni ground partner� doran: that�s it exactly.haass: �you are seriously hamstrung in your effort against isis.doran: yes.
haass: ambassador luers.q: thank you, richard. congratulations to all of you.one issue is how do you deal with the syria�i mean, the sunni strategy that mike has beensaying. how can you keep assad in and still have a sunni strategy? would you address fora minute whether the key to that would be a saudi agreement that isis is basically afundamental threat to their existence, which i think it is? and it�s beginning to beevident in the way the saudis reacted in the killing of the 44 sunnis, jihadists. and iwould argue that a fundamental way to approach a sunni strategy in syria is to get the saudisto agree that it�s now in their interest to�not to support or allow their localsto support the sunnis, and even the shia�the
isis, but actually get the gulf states andsaudi arabia to give us a sunni strategy in syria.haass: let me sort of broaden that, which is, is there any way�i mean, with eithersaudi arabia or turkey, is there any way to influence their policy in syria?(pause.) don�t all speak at once. (laughter.)pillar: you know, i think, bill, it sure would be nice if the saudis more rationally andintelligently followed their own self-interest�(laughs)�in ways that, unfortunately, they haven�t.and this gets into the realm of emotions, of saudi perceptions of assad. this goes backto things like the assassination of rafik hariri in lebanon and how this tugged verystrongly at the heartstrings of saudis, and
they�that�s why they hate assad. it�sa matter of emotion, but not the very sound calculations of their own interests, thatyou accurately describe. there have been times when the saudis havefaced this realization. when they first got hit with al-qaida terrorist attacks in thekingdom, in riyadh, in 2003, then they finally, you know, made some changes in their wholeapproach and weren�t just trying to sort of export the radical sunni problem to otherpeople to worry about. to what extent, you know, like things likethe most recent events may get the wheels turning in the heads of the current regimein riyadh in a way that will go in the direction which you describe, and which i hope it would,i just don�t know. but it�s going to take
a lot of persistent diplomacy and tough lovekind of talks on our part, whether it relates to syria or whether it relates to the broadersaudi approach to radical sunni terrorism. haass: phil, why don�t i give you 30 secondsand mike 30 seconds? gordon: ok.as we�ve all experienced in government, it is really hard and usually unsuccessfulto just tell countries what their interests are, and that they should really be doingwhat we think they should be doing�you know, trust me, seriously, you know, this is inyour interest. and that�s the challenge we confront on this one, richard, with thesaudis and the turks: they just define their interests differently. and we can tell themall they want that their main concern should
be isis, and they just don�t agree. andyou know, we all have a lot of different enemies and adversaries throughout the region; wejust rank them differently. and for the saudis, iran is way ahead of isis, sorry to say. andfor the turks, the kurds are ahead of isis and assad is ahead of isis. and so we cantell them�(laughs)�all we want, and sometimes we might be right, but we�re a long wayfrom persuading them. and that�s why, frankly, both of them havebeen less concerned about�because their overwhelming priority is getting rid of assadand undermining the iranians, and in the turkish case the kurds. they�ve been less concernedabout weapons and money and ideas flowing to radicals in syria because their priorityis something else. and we�ve tried really
hard to get them focused on a different priorityand haven�t been successful. doran: i think they are�i think the saudisand the turks are totally rational, and they�re�and they have defined their interests correctly,and it�s us who are confused. the kurdish problem is the�is the number one problemfor the turks. the iranian problem is the number one problem for the saudis. there is�thesaudis have nothing like the quds force, no instrument for projecting power across theregion. we have adopted a policy from baghdad to beirut that plays into the hands of theiranians. they�re on the rise. we�re doing nothing to stop it. and the saudis have saidto us: if you�re not going to do anything, then we are. so our policy is fueling this�isfueling this escalation between saudi arabia
and iran.we have to�we have to start from the assumption that there is a massive gulf in the regionbetween the iranian alliance of iran, assad, hezbollah, and to a certain degree hamas,and everybody else. and we have to�we have to decide which side we�re on. everybodyin the region�everybody in the region right now says we are tilting toward the iranianside. as long as that perception is out there, we have lost this game.haass: well, on that�(laughter)�this will not be the last such meeting on this set oftopics because we didn�t resolve it today, and something tells me that it will not beresolved in the real world. let me thank these three veterans for coming here and thank youall. (applause.)
(end)this is an uncorrected transcript.
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